limitedly free beings; to say that a certain world is more valuable than any other seems to be simply an arbitrary statement. Furthermore, it is necessary to ask whether human beings are actually free, as Augustine claims. There is always the possibility that we are totally determined. After all, one might argue, human beings do not freely decide to be born, they do not freely decide to be recipients of free will, and they do not freely decide to live in a world dominated by a God who ultimately decides whether one receives punishment or reward. . In other words, if you look at the world this way, that is, a place created and totally dominated by God who decides what is morally good, who ultimately decides the fate of every human being, it seems that human beings are not human beings after all. significantly free. , unless you consider freedom from God's perspective. In reality, Augustine does not realize that if it is as he claims that God foreknows every event in the world, then God created determinate creatures who have no knowledge of being determinate. Augustine points out that, “…although God foreknows our future wills, it does not follow that we do not will something with our will.” (3.3.7.27). Augustine's argument here supports my criticism. That is to say, what follows from this argument is that human beings are not actually free because every action they desire is necessary, therefore already predetermined by God. What Augustine does not understand is that his argument actually demonstrates that human beings humans don't know they are determined, but they are determined! Therefore, as I will point out, God could have created a determinate world, without evil, where beings act freely without knowing that they are actually determinate. I would now like to turn to my first chapter... middle of the paper... in question is capable of doing anything he chooses to do. The second point is that the idea that God cannot create a world with free beings who never choose to do evil is contradictory if we consider the existence of Heaven, which would be a place free from evil where beings are free to exercise one's will and seemingly never choose to do evil. But I will address this issue later. First, the definition of omnipotence I have provided, of course, could be rejected by theologians who would object that “being able to do whatever you choose to do,” for example, does not include “creating a world with free beings who never depart from good and never choose to do evil." But the problem is that if God is omnipotent but there is one thing He cannot do, it follows that omnipotence is not one of God's attributes or omnipotence in this case is a misnomer.