The “Grue Paradox” presented by Nelson Goodman raises challenges to induction and leads us to ask why we make judgments and favor one hypothesis more than another. The "green" hypothesis is more convincing than the "grue" hypothesis because "grue" is subject to change in many circumstances. The hypothesis discussed by Nelson Goodman is an enumerative induction, which concludes that "all emeralds are green" since all of the many emeralds we observed before 2020 are green. Instinctively, this type of inductive argument seems like a good argument because the premises are some examples with the same properties as the conclusion. This hypothesis is confirmed by observations of green emeralds because, according to our knowledge so far, all emeralds are green and no exceptions have been found. In this case, the generalization that all emeralds are green is confirmed by his examples, which are green emeralds. However, introducing a new term “grue,” Goodman states that not all generalizations are necessarily confirmed by their examples. Goodman defines “grue” as follows: “An object is grue if and only if it was first observed before 2020 AD and is green, or if it was not first observed before 2020 AD and is blue” . Since it is the year 2014, all the evidence we have supports the “grue” hypothesis exactly as much as it supports the “green” hypothesis. Following the inductive reasoning above, if we can conclude that “all emeralds are green”, it is equally true that we can conclude “all emeralds are green”. However, this will lead to the absurd conclusion that the emeralds we have observed so far are both green and green, which obviously does not reflect the real case in science because the hypothesis th...... middle of paper.... . .events will occur as they always have in the past. For example, the inference that “all swans we have seen are white and therefore all swans are white” is not justified because black swans were later discovered by Europeans in 1697. If someone has already observed 1000 green emeralds, normally what will he see? what to do is to stop looking for more emeralds and come to the conclusion that "all emeralds are green". This may be true for a limited number of emeralds, but generalization based on previous observations does not give us a guarantee because we have not examined all the emeralds in the world. Even with the problem of induction, we are still justified in concluding that all emeralds are green. Either out of common sense, or due to some constraints of the “grue” hypothesis, we find the induction that concludes that all emeralds are green more convincing.