The 1982 Falklands/Malvinas dispute between Britain and Argentina was inevitable because the two nations had such different views and priorities on land sovereignty. Britain's continued postponements and withdrawals from granting Argentina sovereignty over the land strengthened Argentine nationalist sentiments and undermined any intention of peaceful negotiations. The only plausible way Argentina could have been persuaded to withdraw before the outbreak of war would have been during the initial stages of the conflict. The only convincing tactic against Argentina would have been the use of force, but “an expensive defense commitment to some remote imperial outpost” was the last thing either side wanted (37). Both parties believed they had a legitimate and historic right to the Falkland Islands previously. to 1982 when the conflict broke out. The UK's justification was that an English explorer had been the first to set foot and colonize the islands in 1690. Even when Argentine inhabitants colonized the territory in 1823, the English gradually replaced them and inhabited the territory for over 150 years. In contrast, the Argentine's claim was based on the continuity of Spain and an Anglo-Spanish agreement of 1771 in which the English had claimed no sovereignty (35). The modern history of this conflict began in 1965 with the involvement of the United Nations on the issue, but became prominent in 1981. The United Nations strongly advised that the two resolve the issue peacefully; the paranoid reverberations of the Cold War were still universally extant at that time. Both Argentina and Great Britain agreed that they did not want to fight; this was especially the case in Argentina, which was going through a change in the ruling regime, and was suffering from economic problems and... half of paper... suffered more while also dealing with internal civil unrest and imposed trade embargoes in addition to the Falklands/Malvinas dispute. It was only a matter of time before Argentina finally resorted to physical action. It was impossible for this nation to give up its sovereignty after all the time and effort spent obtaining the islands, and Galtieri even admitted that he “could not withdraw both his military and administrative presence from the Malvinas to last a week” (57). The surrender of the Malvinas would mean the automatic devastation of the entire country: Argentina would never be the same, Galtieri would be toppled from power, and further civil unrest would ensue. Therefore, Argentina could not have been persuaded to withdraw from the war. Argentinians have done everything they can to avoid war for a long time, but there is only so much anyone can tolerate.