Through his discussion of morality in The Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant explores the question of whether a human being is capable of acting solely out of pure duty and whether our actions have true moral value. In passage 407, page 19, Kant proposes that if one were to look at past experiences, one cannot be certain that his rationalization for performing an action in accordance with duty could be based solely on moral grounds. To fully explain the fundamental principle of moral theory, Kant distinguishes between key notions such as a priori and a posteriori and between hypothetical imperative and categorical imperative, in order to discuss whether the actions of rational beings are actually moral or whether they are moral at all. only moral because of one's hidden inclinations. When Kant says, "When considering moral value, the concern is not with actions, which are seen, but rather with their inner principles, which are not seen," on page 19, he is suggesting that the true motivations of a person behind the action are more important in determining whether the action has true moral value. As Jonathan Bennett, a British philosopher of language and metaphysics who translated Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, says, when moral value is in question it is not a question of visible actions but of their invisible inner principles (Bennett, 19) . Kant explains that a human being can have inclinations, reasons for doing something, beyond moral reasons. Inclinations are motivations (desires, interests, incentives, fears or impulses) that one may possess, but which sometimes seem hidden when performing an action. If there is a motive behind the performance of an action, other than duty alone, then it can be considered the... at the center of the card... value by discussing duty in light of an a priori and experience . In conclusion, it suggests that since actions depend on specific circumstances, a priori beliefs cannot be extracted from experience. People's experiences and actions are based on circumstantial motivations; therefore they cannot conform to categorical imperatives either because categorical imperatives are intrinsically good principles and must be respected despite the circumstances or situation. Kant concludes that rational beings are ends in themselves and that the principle is a universal law, which derives from reason and not from experience. Works Cited Bennett, Jonathan. "Foundations for the metaphysics of morality". http://www.stolaf.edu/.Np, July 2005. Web. 17 February 2014. Kant, Immanuel, and James W. Ellington. Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub., 1981. Print.