Free will and the concept of person The theme of free will as an effective choice, or predestined being, has been deeply reflected in the minds of philosophers, especially for the purpose of the logic of people . I will argue that both David Hume and Harry Frankfurt's articles on the discussion of free will are convincing, because of compatibilism, in which a human being has the capacity to have a correlation between free will and determinism, just as Hume would argue agreement with the Frankfurt concept of second-order violations. In David Hume's article, Of Liberty and Necessity, he describes: “Not only is the conjunction between motives and voluntary actions as regular and uniform as that between cause and effect in any part of nature; but also that this regular conjunction has been universally recognized among men” (Perry, Fischer, Bratman 410). Hume argues that the causes and effects of nature correspond to the philosophical perception of free will. Likewise, he explains, “The constant conjunction of objects, and the consequent inference of the mind from one to the other, and the discovery that these two circumstances are universally permitted to have a place in voluntary actions” (Perry, Fischer, Bratman 412). By constant conjunctions, Hume refers to two objects and the relationship between them, while inference is the understanding of one object in relation to another, both concepts are necessary in the actions of human nature. Notably, Hume's entire article is based solely on freedom, which refers to free will, as well as necessity which supports the belief in determinism. Hume deliberately states his anti-libertarian argument, as libertarians believe determinism is false. Initially, Hume defines freedom as, ... middle of paper ... that the only way a second-order violation can occur, is through a free and responsible action caused by the agent himself, which is also an object that Hume would take into consideration. Finally, Frankfurt states, “When a person decisively identifies with one of his first-order desires, this commitment 'resonates' across the potentially infinite range of higher orders” (Perry, Fischer, Bratman 446). Hume would respond to this positively, in the name of the belief that each individual has a decision that he is free to make about his own actions in both first-order desires and second-order violations. Overall, Hume and Frankfurt's views on compatibilism as a whole are both legitimate through the explanation that there is no incompatibility between free will and determinism and that diversity exists in the world in particular, due to the act of free will.