Introduction: In this essay I will argue that Rosenthal's theory of higher order thought provides a possible explanation of conscious awareness, thus addressing and solving the mind problem -body for that particular mental phenomenon. I will begin by defining what makes a mental state conscious. This will be done by aiming to distinguish what type of state we are referring to when we talk about a mental phenomenon and how it can have a plausible explanation. By taking this first approach, we are able to build a foundation for our main argument to be clear enough and to which we can remain committed. Next, I will proceed to describe what HOT theories are, what conditions or requirements they contain, as well as mention some constraints that they can exhibit and which in turn can motivate them. At this point I will begin to develop a more explicit account of how Rosenthal's theory of higher-order thought seeks to explain consciousness in certain mental states such as awareness. First-order theories are a challenge to any higher-order theory of thought; I will therefore briefly review some of them, as they represent the other type of theories that challenge the explanation of consciousness. Furthermore, one of these FO theories is strongly supported by Ned Block, who is the main objector of Rosenthal's HOT theories in this essay. Some examples will be added that are necessary to help us, in supporting the main argument and to facilitate the definition of some requirements for a HOT to occur in a conscious state. Third, some of Ned Block's objections to the higher-order theory of thinking will be considered and revised in order to reaffirm the validity of the main argument. Block's objections will be taken as the main challenge to Rosenthal's HO theory....... half of the article...... higher order theory provides an encouraging investigation of the many connections that the consciousness has with other mental phenomena. To conclude this In this essay, I like to point out that Rosenthal's HOT is more of an empirical hypothesis, rather than an analysis of the term "consciousness". His aim is precisely to explain the phenomena of consciousness in relation to other mental states, such as thought and perception, and in achieving this objective he has developed a theoretical framework for understanding the functions of our mind. We may be able to conceive of consciousness in the absence of higher order states, but that does not mean that we can explain consciousness in the absence of higher order states. Works Cited Rosenthal D 2002, 'Explaining Consciousness', in Philosophy of Mind Classical and Contemporary Readings, Chalmers DJ (ed.), Oxford University Publishing House, New York